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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Real Party in Interest-Insurance-Partially Subrogated
Insurer's Standing To Sue
In Southeastern Fire Ins. Co. v. Moore' the North Carolina Supreme
Court held that payment by an insurance company of the damage done
to insured's car, less fifty dollars deductible under the policy terms, did
not entitle the insurer to sue the third party tort-feasor in its own name.
The court found that the insurer had sought "to split an indivisible
cause of action" and that it was not the real party in interest. Also, the
insured had received the money in the form of a "loan" repayable only
in the event of his recovery from the tort-feasor, and the court intimated
that this arrangement was not a payment entitling the insurer to subro-
gation.
Under common law rules of pleading, all actions had to be main-
tained in the name of the person whose legal right had been affected.2
So, in a tort case, only the injured party himself could be the plaintiff.
Subsequently, code pleading and the Federal Rules adopted real party
in interest provisions embodying the practice followed in equity of allow-
ing any person with a substantial beneficial interest in the claim to sue
in his own name.3 Under these provisions, including the North Caro-
lina statute,4 the following rules are applied. When an insurer pays an
insured's claim on a policy it becomes subrogated pro tanto to any right
of action which the insured may have against a third party responsible
for the loss.5 When the insurer has paid the entire loss sustained, the
insured having no further beneficial interest in the claim, the former
may sue the tort-feasor in its own name.6 However, the rule against
splitting a cause of action requires that the legal title to the right of
action for the entire claim must remain in the insured when the payment
by the insurer does not cover the whole loss. 7 Upon recovery, the insured
holds all proceeds in excess of the previously uncompensated amount of
1250 N.C. 351, 108 S.E.2d 618 (1959).
2 CLARK, CODE PLEADING § 24 (2d ed. 1947).
CLARK, op. cit. supra note 2, § 21; 3 MooaE, FEDR...L PRACTrCE 17.03 (2d
ed. 1948).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-57 (1953). The real party in interest must have some
interest in the subject matter of the litigation, and not merely an interest in the
action itself. Choate Rental Co. v. justice, 211 N.C. 54, 188 S.E. 609 (1936).
r CLARK, op. cit. supra note 2, § 24; 3 MooPE, op. cit. supra note 3, 1 17.09;
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-176 (1950).
1 Burgess v. Trevathan, 236 N.C. 157, 72 S.E.2d 231 (1952) ; Service Fire Ins.
Co. v. Horton Motor Lines, Inc., 225 N.C. 588, 35 S.E.2d 879 (1945); Powell &
Powell, Inc. v. Wake Water Co., 171 N.C. 290, 88 S.E. 426 (1916) ; Cunningham
& Hinshaw v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 139 N.C. 427, 51 S.E. 1029 (1905) ; CLARK,
op. cit. supra note 2, § 24; 3 MooaE op. cit. svpra note 3, 17.09.7Yorkshire Ins. Co. v. United States, 171 F.2d 374 (3d Cir. 1948) ; Burgess v.
Trevathan, mupra note 6; Powell & Powell, Inc. v. Wake Water Co., supra note 6;
29 Am. JuR. Insurance § 1358 (1940) ; 46 C.J.S. Insurance § 1211 (1946) ; CLARK,
op. cit. supra note 2, § 24; 3 MooRn, op. cit. vipra note 3, 1117.09.
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his claim as trustee for the insurer.8 The latter rule is designed to pro-
tect the tort-feasor from the inconvenience and expense of being forced
to defend against more than one action for a single indivisible wrong.
There remains a problem when an insurer finds it necessary or advisable
to sue the tort-feasor in the company name when it has not paid the
full amount of the insured's lossY The question, then, is how the in-
surer can secure a surrender of all beneficial interest in the claim from
the insured and vest the title of real party in interest in itself.
Generally, there are two methods by which this may be done. First,
assignment appears to provide the surest and most practical solution
to the problem. Whether an assignment to the insurer of the insured's
entire right of action is made for additional consideration or not, such
an assignment will enable the insurer to sue for the full amount of the
loss.10 Care must be taken in drawing an assignment without further
consideration to specify that the assignment is absolute and final and
that the assignor (insured) has forever parted with all beneficial interest
in the claim to be litigated. This is necessary to avoid the possibility
that the assignment be found to be one for collection only and thus
invalid in North Carolina. 1 Another caveat should be observed if the
assignment is in exchange for additional consideration. It should be
made clear that the insurer is purchasing the insured's claim, and not
making an additional payment pursuant to the policy. The latter would
presumably constitute a payment in excess of the insurance contract
'Powell & Powell, Inc. v. Wake Water Co., 171 N.C. 290, 88 S.E. 426 (1916).
But cf. Patitucci v. Gerhardt, 206 Wis. 358, 240 N.W. 385 (1932), where the court
held that the trial judge should always join the insurer whenever the latter's
existence in the case comes to the judge's attention, though it is not reversible
error to fail to do so.
' This problem may arise where the insured has for some reason left the state
after the accident and, after being informed of the need for his co-operation, fails
to co-operate with the insurer. Plaintiff's attorney informed this writer that the
insured in the principal case, while still within the state and legally bound by the
"loan" agreement to co-operate, was reluctant to participate even to the small
extent of signing the verification. Perhaps such reluctance may be appreciated
when it is considered that the most the insured can realize from a recovery against
the tort-feasor would be the deductible amount not covered by the insurance minus,
usually, one-third which the insurer keeps for the expense of prosecuting the
action. For obvious reasons it is not advisable to compel the insurer's primary
witness to join in the action against his will.
"0 General Exch. Ins. Corp. v. Carp, 176 So. 145 (La. 1937).
"Federal Reserve Bank v. Whitford, 207 N.C. 267, 176 S.E. 584 (1934) ; Bank
v. Rochamora, 193 N.C. 1, 136 S.E. 259 (1927); Martin v. Mask, 158 N.C. 436,
74 S.E. 343 (1912). See generally 3 M'ooRE, op. cit. supra note 3, 17.09, where
Professor Moore comments that states following this rule have given substantive
effect to the real party in interest provision where only procedural effect was in-
tended by the original code-drafters. Under the Federal Rules an assignee for
collection only is the real party in interest. Rosenblum v. Dingfelder, 111 F.2d
406 (2d Cir. 1940). Where such assignment is to a partial subrogee, the North
Carolina rule would seem by implication to treat the respective claims of insurer
and insured as separate causes of action. There appear to be no North Carolina
cases directly in point.
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and would be a violation of the anti-discrimination provision of the
state's insurance laws.' 2
The other method involves the permissive splitting of a cause of
action, which may be done in several ways. Generally, this can be
accomplished only with the consent of the defendant. While it can be
assumed that he will not consent if it would leave him liable to face
prosecution in more than one suit for a single tort, it is possible to split
the cause and still give him protection against multiplicity of suits.
13
The insured can give the tort-feasor a release or a covenant not to sue
for the uncompensated part of the claim. By accepting the release or
covenant the tort-feasor consents to the splitting, but since the insured
is now barred he will have to face only one suit for the loss.' The con-
sideration for the covenant or release can be any nominal amount if
the tort-feasor is unwilling to pay the insured the actual amount of his
uncompensated loss. It is essential that such a release clearly recite
that only the part of the loss not covered by insurance is to be released.
A release of the entire claim may result in a complete bar to action by
either the insured or the insurer against the tort-feasor.r5 For this
reason it may be safer from the standpoint of the insurer to have the
insured use a covenant, which is only a bar to suit by the covenantor
(insured) rather than a bar to action on the claim itself. 16
In Service Fire Ins. Co. v. Horton Motor Lines,"t a case similar to
the principal one, the insurer commenced an action in its own name
against the tort-feasor just prior to the running of the statute of limi-
' N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 58-44.3, -198 (1950). Quaere, what is the difference,
other than in form, between a payment in excess of the insurance contract and a
purchase by insurer of insured's claim, when the net result in either case would be
to vest the real party in interest title in the insurer?
" This is not to say, however, that the defendant cannot waive his right to this
protection. This may be done by filing answers on the merits to separate com-
plaints of the insurer and insured or simply by failing to enter a timely objection
to the standing to sue of the insurer in a separate action by the latter. In failing
to object the defendant impliedly consents to a splitting of the cause of action.
Southern Stock Fire Ins. Co. v. Southern Ry., 179 N.C. 290, 102 S.E. 504 (1920).
" Powell & Powell, Inc. v. Wake Water Co., 171 N.C. 290, 88 S.E. 426 (1916);
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Wabash Ry., 74 Mo. App. 106 (1898).
" Fidelity Ins. Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry., 165 N.C. 136, 80 S.E. 1069
(1914), held that insurer was barred from suing the tort-feasor who had paid ajudgment held by the insured for the entire loss. Powell & Powell, Inc. v. Wake
Water Co., supra note 14, held that where tort-feasor has knowledge of insurer's
rights prior to settlement, such release will be effective only as to insured's un-
compensated loss, unless the payment was in excess of this loss, in which case the
release would be a defense pro tanto to the extent of the excess amount paid. But
see Casualty Reciprocal Exch. v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 230 Mo. App. 468,
91 S.W.2d 227 (1936), where insurer was barred even though tort-feasor had
knowledge of subrogation rights prior to the settlement with insured. Contra,
Camden Fire Ins. Ass'n v. Bleem, 132 Misc. 22, 227 N.Y. Supp. 746 (Buffalo City
Ct. 1928) ; Brighthope Ry. v. Rogers, 76 Va. 443 (1881). These cases held that
a release of tort-feasor by insured after subrogation had occurred is ineffective as
a release of insurer's claim, regardless of notice to tort-feasor.
" Pellett v. Sonotone Corp., 26 Cal. 2d 705, 160 P.2d 783 (1945).17225 N.C. 588, 35 S.E.2d 879 (1945),
19591
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
tations. The defendant demurred on the ground that the insurer was
not the real party in interest. After the statutory period had expired
the insurer's motion to join the insured as a party plaintiff was granted.
On appeal the court sustained the overruling of the demurrer on the
ground that the statute of limitations is a plea in bar and may not be
raised by demurrer. Although not put in issue by the demurrer, the
following questions were present: When a partially subrogated insurer
institutes an action in its own name before the statute of limitations has
run, does the subsequent barring of the insured's claim by the statute
also leave the insurer barred? Or does the expiration of the statute
period result in the insurer becoming the "only party having an en-
forceable claim' 18 and thus the legal real party in interest? An affirmative
answer to the first question would be predicated upon the contention
that the insurer was not the real party in interest before the statute ran
and that the subsequent barring of the insured's claim should in no
way alter that fact. Accordingly, under the doctrine of derivative rights
of subrogation, the subrogee (insurer) should accede to no greater
rights than those of the subrogor (insured), who would be barred by
the statute. An affirmative answer to the second question perhaps could
be sustained by reasoning that after the statute has run the insurer holds
the only legally enforceable claim against which the tort-feasor could
be forced to defend. Therefore, the defendant would be afforded the
same protective rights embodied in the rule against splitting a cause of
action and would not have to face a multiplicity of suits. Unfortunately,
the court here did not meet this issue, 19 and it has not yet been decided
in this state. Although the latter position apparently has been accepted
by one federal court,20 it would not appear safe to rely solely upon this
method to vest the real-party title in a partially subrogated insurer.
However, if no alternative were available, it might be argued as a last
resort to avert the possibility of leaving the insurer remedyless in statute-
of-limitation cases.
There is one other procedure possibly available to the insurer, that
of waiver by the insured of his right in the claim. The plaintiff in the
principal case endeavored to invoke this doctrine against the defendant's
contention that the insurer was not the real party in interest.21 In a
sworn affidavit, the insured expressly "disavowed any interest in said
2Id. at 591, 35 S.E.2d at 881.
1In regard to the plaintiff-insurer's right to sue in its own name after the
running of the statute, the court, through Justice Barnhill, said: "What the re-
spective rights of the parties may be in the event it is made to appear . . . that
Medlin's [the insured's] claim for damages, in part, is still outstanding and un-
satisfied, but his right of action is barred by the statute of limitations, so that the
plaintiff [insurer] is now the only party having an enforceable claim, must be
reserved for decision at the trial below. The facts there developed will control the
ruling of the court" Ibid.
"' Yorkshire Ins. Co. v. United States, 171 F.2d 374 (3d Cir. 1948).21 250 N.C. at 352, 108 S.E.2d at 618.
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cause of action" and further declared "that she has no interest in this
cause of action and that the sole remaining interest to be determined...
is that of the Southeastern Fire Insurance Company .... -22 It was
argued that the following testimony of the insured in open court under
oath also constituted a waiver: "I have not filed any suit in connection
with this automobile accident; I do not presently have any interest in
it."'23 The plaintiff contended that if the current action were allowed to
proceed to judgment through reliance upon these statements by the
insured, then the insured would be estopped to institute any subsequent
action against the defendant. The court, while it apparently recognized
the plaintiff's contention,24 did not discuss the question of waiver in
its opinion. Thus, the criteria by which the court will be guided in
this area remain unknown. If this jurisdiction is to allow such a waiver
at all, it is difficult to envision a more appropriate opportunity for its
application than that presented by the principal case. Waiver of rights
ranging from those established under ordinary contracts and tort claims
to those granted by the Constitution of the United States are frequently
permitted under proper circumstances.2 5 There appears to be no valid
reason why waiver by the insured in the situation at hand should not
be allowed.
There is some language in the opinion of the principal case2 6 which
indicates that the court may have based its decision in part upon the
"loan receipt" 27 signed by the insured. The original purpose for the
use of the "loan" device by insurance companies was to prevent the real
party in interest title from leaving the insured and vesting in the insurer
upon full payment of the insured's loss. 2 8  The assumption was that the
-2 Record, p. 13. 23 Id. at 19.
"250 N.C. at 352, 108 S.E.2d at 618.
"Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930) (waiver of a constitutional
right); Minneapolis Threshing Mach. Co. v. Hutchins, 65 Minn. 89, 67 N.W. 807
(1896) (waiver of right under a contract) ; People v. Brady, 257 App. Div. 1000,
13 N.Y.S.2d 789 (1939) (waiver of a right under the statute of limitations);
Pascal v. Burke Transit Co., 229 N.C. 435, 50 S.E.2d 534 (1948). Cf. N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 97-10 (1946), wherein the North Carolina Workman's Compensation Act
provides that if the employer of the injured employee does not sue the third party
tort-feasor within six months after the date-of the injury, he waives this right,
and the employee may bring the action himself, although the employer will still
share in the recovery.
" The court, through Justice Denny, quoted with approval 46 C.J.S. Insurance§ 1209 (1946) : "Insurer's rights to subrogation accrue on payment of the insurance
claim; but until payment of the claim on the policy no rights to subrogation accrue.
An advance by insurer of the amount of insurance to insured under an agreement
reciting that the amount was received as a loan to be repaid only from such re-
covery as might be had from the other party is not a payment entitling the insurer
to subrogation." 250 N.C. at 354, 108 S.E.2d at 620.
" The receipt read, in part: "Received from the Southeastern Fire Insurance
Company the sum of Four Hundred Sixty-One and 96/100 Dollars ($461.96) as a
loan, without interest, repayable only in the event and to the extent of any net
recovery the insured may make from any person . . . liable for the loss ... .
Record, addendum, p. 1.
" Annot., 157 A.L.R. 1261 (1945).
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use of the insured's name would result in a more sympathetic treatment
by the jury than if the insurance company itself brought the action."0
Where the insurance covers the entire loss, the question of who is the
real party in interest may depend upon whether there as been in fact a
loan or a full payment.3 0  However, this loan device is of very doubtful
utility in the case of a claim arising under an automobile collision policy
containing a deductible clause. Regardless of whether the insurer has
paid or loaned the amount of the damage, less the deductible figure,
the court will require the use of the insured's name as the real party in
interest 3 ' unless one of the procedures outlined above is employed to
vest this title in the insurer.
ALLAN W. MARKHAM
Torts-Insulating Negligence in North Carolina
The doctrine of insulating negligence and the task of predicting how
the court will hold in an intervening negligence situation continue to be
problems in North Carolina. The issue of insulation arises when one
party through a negligent act or omission has created an unreasonable
risk of harm to others and a second actor through a subsequent act or
omission brings the risk to reality to the injury of the plaintiff. The
problem is whether the two tort-feasors may be held jointly liable or
whether the first tort-feasor is insulated by the later negligence of the
second tort-feasor. Our court has said that the problem of insulating
negligence is one of proximate cause' and that the test is whether the
-" Quaere, whether this assumption is valid today where often there is an in-
surer behind the plaintiff in automobile damage suits, and most jurors are aware
of this fact.
"In Cumingham & Hinshaw v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 139 N.C. 427, 51 S.E.
1029 (1905), it was determined by the jury that the "loan" was in fact a full and
final payment of the plaintiff-insured's claim by the insurer, thereby divesting the
insured of any standing to sue on the claim. Contra, Sosnow, Kranz & Simcoe,
Inc. v. Storatti Corp., 269 App. Div. 122, 54 N.Y.S.2d 780 (1945), where a suit
in the insured's name under a similar loan agreement was permitted, as it did not
prejudice the defendant, i.e., it would not allow the plaintiff a double recovery nor
make the defendant liable to multiple suits for the same wrong. Accord, McCann
v. Dixie Lake & Realty Co., 44 Ga. App. 700, 162 S.E. 869 (1932).
31 The court will not, however, raise the issue ex viero motza if the defendant
does not object. Southern Stock Fire Ins. Co. v. Southern Ry., 179 N.C. 290, 102
S.E. 504 (1920).
1 Montgomery v. Blades, 222 N.C. 463, 23 S.E.2d 844 (1943) ; Luttrell v. Caro-
lina Mineral Co., 220 N.C. 782, 18 S.E.2d 412 (1942) ; Butner v. Spease, 217 N.C.
82, 6 S.E.2d 808 (1940). The generally accepted definition of proximate cause in
North Carolina is that announced in Adams v. State Bd. of Educ., 248 N.C. 506,
511, 103 S.E.2d 854, 857 (1958): "Proximate cause is a cause which in natural
and continuous sequence, unbroken by any new and independent cause, produced the
plaintiff's injuries, and without which the injuries would not have occurred, and
from which a person of ordinary prudence could have reasonably foreseen that
such a result, or some similar injurious result, was probable under the facts as they
existed." McIntyre v. Monarch Elevator & Mach. Co., 230 N.C. 539, 54 S.E.2d
45 (1949) ; .Cant v. Gant, 197 N.C. 164, 148 S.E. 34 (1929) ; Van Dyke v. Chad-
[Vol. 38
